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Abstract
Background: In Norway, a government reform has recently been introduced to enhance coordination between primary
and secondary care. This paper examines the effects of two newly introduced measures to improve the coordination: an
ICT-based communication tool/standard and an economic incentive scheme.
Method: This qualitative study is based primarily on 27 open-ended interviews. We interviewed nine employees at a
hospital (the focal actor), 17 employees from seven different municipalities, and a representative of a Regional Health
Authority.
Results: ICT-based communication is perceived to facilitate information exchange between primary and secondary care,
thus positively affecting coordination. However, the economic incentive scheme appears to have the opposite effect by
creating tensions between the two organizations and accentuating power asymmetry in favor of secondary care.
Conclusions: The inter-organizational nature of coordination in health care makes it crucial for policymakers and
management of care organizations to conceive incentives and instruments that work jointly across organizations rather
than at only one of the health care organizations involved. Such an approach is likely to favor a more symmetrical pattern
of collaboration between primary and secondary care.
Keywords: Health care, Coordination, Communication, Policy, Integrated care, Health care network
Background
Health care provision is considered a collective work, but
health care organizations tend to work autonomously [1].
The tendency of health care organizations to work in
‘distinct silos’ [2] can be associated with different issues. It
is related to existence of strong professional boundaries [3],
which inhibit collaboration and knowledge sharing across
boundaries [4]. As part of a care continuum, professionals
in the two settings might compete for jurisdiction over
certain tasks [5]. Jurisdiction, defined as the “the link
between a profession and its work” [6], is crucial for profes-
sionals because it is their means of continued livelihood [7].
The unequal distribution of power among health care orga-
nizations is an obstacle to collaboration. Hospitals, provid-
ing most health care services and ultimately receiving most
of the resources, traditionally enjoy a privileged position
[8]. Primary care organizations and those working within
them depend on hospitals for many aspects of care
provision; they are typically given much less resources to
provide follow-up or preventive care in the home or com-
munity setting that primary care organizations deliver [8].
The evidence suggests that improved coordination among
health care contributes to enhance quality of care and effi-
ciency performance [9]. Consequently, policymakers are in-
creasingly tinkering with mechanisms to integrate activities
across health care organizations [10–13]. New models of
organizing and delivering care have been developed in the
pursuit of transcending primary and specialty care bound-
aries and improving care coordination [14]. However, it has
been observed that mechanisms through which coordin-
ation is to be achieved are not well understood [15] and
“rarely identified in relevant policies” [16].
Coordination here refers to “the deliberate organization
of patient care activities between two or more participants
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involved in a patient’s care to facilitate the appropriate
delivery of health care services” [17]. In this study, we will
focus on care coordination between primary and second-
ary care. A timely exchange of appropriate information
among health care professionals has been identified as a
prerequisite for care coordination [17]. There are, in par-
ticular, two situations/processes in which communication
between hospital professionals and professionals at the
primary level of care is critical: When the patient is trans-
ferred from municipal care to the hospital (admission or
readmission), and when the patient is transferred from
hospital to municipal nursing care (discharge). A deficit in
communication when patients are transferred across
health care providers can cause ineffective care for pa-
tients [18]. Information exchange during the hospital dis-
charge process is fundamental for decision-making
(preceded by the assessment of patient’s conditions) of the
after-hospitalization care service patients need [19].
Inappropriate or delayed information during discharge
process can result in patients staying at hospital longer
than necessary, waiting for the appropriate follow up care
service to be arranged, or receiving inappropriate follow
up care services, which might lead to increase in readmis-
sions [20]. According to Peikes et al. [21], intervention to
improve care coordination should put more emphasis on
preventing readmissions, which are the costlier health care
events.
Supporting communication among health care organiza-
tions has been identified as way to improve organizational
efficiency and effectiveness as well as offering the opportun-
ity to improve patient care [22, 23]. Since the 1990s, infor-
mation and communication technologies (ICT) have
attracted increasing attention as facilitating tools in the
health care sector. Health information technology has been
seen to have “the potential to improve coordination by mak-
ing information electronically available” [24]. At a hospital,
managers consider “IT as the key tool for achieving a better
information flow and better services, as well as for comply-
ing with organizational objectives regarding high quality in
patient care treatment” [25]. At primary care, the implemen-
tation of ICT systems has been shown to be a catalyst in
establishing new communication procedures [26]. However,
tensions generated by ICT system, in particular by the intro-
duction and use of electronic health records (EHR), have
been also evidenced in a number of studies [27–30]. One
recurrent concern here is the tension between structure and
flexible documentation [30]. It has been found “that physi-
cians who predominantly dictated their notes appeared to
have worse quality of care, especially as compared to physi-
cians who used structured EHR documentation” [28].
Bossen [27] emphasizes that there are different “representa-
tions at work in IT technology” that “enable cooperation,
coordination, accountability and control,” and that these
have to be “balanced off against each other.”
A more accurate and comprehensive sharing of infor-
mation through ICT systems is not the only area of
intervention to enhance care coordination. Improvement
of care coordination has been associated with several
financial strategies, including both incentives and penal-
ties [31]. Activity-based funding (ABF) systems, pro-
spective reimbursement based on patient case mix, have
been generally considered successful in improving finan-
cial transparency and creating incentives for technical
efficiency [32]. However, it has been observed that they
have offered little to create incentives outside of the hos-
pital, in addressing the lack of coordination across health
care providers and settings [33]. As result, there is
increasing interest in exploring financial incentives for
care coordination across providers and settings [33]. The
key question to be addressed is: which incentives should
be operated at the interface between primary and sec-
ondary health care in order to motivate professionals to
use their resources to achieve the best possible health
outcomes? [34, 35]. Accountable care organizations
(ACOs) and bundled payments are designed to create
monetary incentives for coordinated care. These mea-
sures range from “penalizing hospitals with higher-than-
expected readmission rates, to rewarding primary care
providers when patients receive higher-value care, to
providing incentives for the adoption of electronic health
records” [36]. The ambition with this incentives scheme
is that coordination will “improve value by ensuring that
the right care is provided in the right place at the right
time” [36].
In this study, we examine the case of Norway, as the
Norwegian government, on January 1, 2012, has introduced
a coordination reform to enhance care coordination and
more efficient use of resources in the Norwegian health
care system [37] designing instruments along the aforemen-
tioned lines. The government introduced a new ICT solu-
tion to facilitate communication between professionals at
the primary and secondary levels and opted for an incentive
scheme that aims to stimulate a change in the way primary
care manages the in/out hospital transition of patients. In
Norway, health care is publicly funded, primary care is
managed by 429 municipalities, while specialist health care
is managed by four state-owned Regional Health organiza-
tions/authorities. Key objectives of the reform have been: 1)
more patients should be taken care of in primary health
care instead of specialized care; and 2) discharge from hos-
pitals should take place earlier [38]. To pursue these
objectives, the Norwegian Ministry of Health and Care
Services has set as priority to improve communication and
coordination between hospitals and municipal health care
systems [39]. The Norwegian government opted for a
renewal of the information and communication system
with the introduction of electronic health care messages
(PLO, an acronym for ‘Pleie- og omsorgsmeldinger’). The
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effort put in the development of an electronic messaging
system to better connect primary and secondary care is
also due to a regulation in Norway that clearly indicate
responsibilities, administrative and financial structures of
the two systems of care. This regulation prescribes that it
is a unit (‘ordering office’ or ‘purchasing unit’) at the
primary level of care, which has the responsibility and
authority to assess individual needs, formulate contracts,
decide and order care services and control outcomes of
care the providers deliver [40].
Besides the ICT-based communication, the government
moved some care funding (5 billion Nok) from hospitals
to municipalities, which, in turn, became responsible for
co-financing hospital admissions of patients in need of
selected somatic health care services. This measure’s aim
is twofold: reduce hospital costs by reducing unnecessary
admissions and providing more resources to primary care
thereby trying to revise the ‘privileged position’ of hospi-
tals [8] in favour of a potential empowerment of primary
care. Furthermore, according to a payment regulation
reform (the so-called Betalingsforskrift), when a munici-
pality is unable to receive a patient declared ready for hos-
pital discharge, it must pay a fee (4,500 Nok) to the
hospital. This fee is meant to compensate the hospital for
every 24 h the patient has to stay in the hospital. This
measure aims to shorten length of stay after the scheduled
discharge date, thus facilitating patient transition and
reducing waiting time for hospital treatment [41]. Overall,
these measures fit into the broader, and common across
countries, agenda of improving cost-efficiency of hospitals
and the consequent effort to strengthen primary health
care [42, 43].
Previous studies have warned about reforms not being
‘neutral’ instruments and not always producing intended
effects [44]. This makes it interesting and relevant to
examine the effects of the measures promoted by the
coordination reform to improve care coordination be-
tween a hospital and some municipalities in the relevant
catchment area. In this qualitative paper, we describe
how the two instruments – electronic communication
and a new economic incentive system – settled by the
government in pursuit of better coordination between
primary and secondary care, have been translated into
practice by health care professionals belonging to differ-
ent health care settings. We aim to explore how the two
instruments in place might interact with each other and/
or and which effects these measures might produce
independently of the declared aim ascribed to them. Our
study adds to existing knowledge about care coordin-
ation and the mechanisms to enhance it [2, 15, 16, 23,
45, 46]. More narrowly, this study engages into an
ongoing debate in the literature about the attempts to
reform health care in Norway. This research can be seen
as a follow-up of previous studies, which have explored
care coordination mechanisms conducted before the coord-
ination reform was introduced [19] and have delineated
possible negative side effects of the reform [38]. It also
complements a study exploring the effects of the reform,
thus highlighting an increased need for inter-municipal
cooperation after the reform was introduced [47].
Method
This study is part of a larger longitudinal research project
investigating changes within and across health care orga-
nizations when introducing electronic messaging and
mobile solutions. The study has been approved by the
Data Protection Official for Research (ref. no.14-022) and
cleared with the “REC South East”, a Regional Committees
for Medical and Health Research Ethics (REK) in Norway.
In our study we have only gathered data from and about
healthcare professionals. All informants were asked to par-
ticipate in our qualitative research project, and they got
written materials regarding the design and aims of the
research project in due time before the interviews. At the
start of each interview, informed consent was confirmed
by participants and anonymity was guaranteed.
Recruitment of participants and data collection
The primary material in this paper derives from 27 face-to-
face, semi structured interviews conducted with key infor-
mants between December 2013 and January 2015 (see
Table 1) in the health care sector at the secondary level of
care (one focal hospital that, for confidentiality reasons, will
be “the Hospital” hereinafter) and at the primary level of
care (seven related municipalities whose names have been
anonymized). For selecting respondents, we used a
convenience sampling asking for assistance from the
Department A of the Hospital. Based on its knowledge
about our project and on past collaboration with hospital
personnel, the Department A provided us a list of potential
respondents belonging to different divisions and covering
different roles. We subsequently contacted the potential
respondents by e-mail, providing information about the
project and checking their availability for face-to-face inter-
views. We followed a similar procedure for selecting the
respondents at the municipality level. Based on an initial
contact list provided by Department A, we contacted by
e-mail the municipalities in the catchment area of the
Hospital explaining the objective of the study and asking
availability for an interview. Snowball sampling was also
used to recruit more informed participants within the con-
tacted municipality. Finally, one of the respondents (R27)
was purposefully selected because of the respondent’s role
as representative of the Regional Health Authority.
At the primary care level, we interviewed 17 care pro-
fessionals working in eight different municipalities,
mostly at the ordering office, which is the unit that has
the authority to decide what care services a patient will
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need/receive when discharged from a hospital. At the
Hospital, we interviewed clinicians of four divisions and
five respondents with no strictly medical responsibility.
We also interviewed a representative of the Regional
Health Authorities. Secondary data in the form of official
reports to the health authority, official hospital and
municipalities’ internal documents and records, press re-
leases, and previously published articles on this matter
were also collected to achieve the study’s objectives. The
multiple data sources enabled cross checking through
triangulation, and the prolonged engagement of the
authors within the field allowed for a thorough appreci-
ation of the context [48].
In terms of how the interview guide was devised, we
have been guided by our initial frame of reference [49]
by focusing on the link between the two measures in
place and improvement of care coordination. At the
beginning of the interviews, all the participants were
asked the question: ‘Could you describe your role, tasks
and responsibilities?’ This question was broadly formu-
lated for capturing eventual and spontaneous aspects of
the collaboration between the respondent and the coun-
terpart organization not likely to emerge with more
specific questions. The second open-ended question
allowed respondents to elaborate on particular areas that
they regarded as important: ‘What are the main issues of
concern in collaborating and coordinating with your
counterpart?’ Through questions three: ‘Do you see any
benefit of the new communication system for your work
practices and for coordination between primary and
secondary care?’ and four ‘Do you see any challenges of
the new communication system for your work practices
and for coordination between primary and secondary
care?’ we aimed to explore the actual experience of
respondents with using the new ICT tool, both for their
internal documenting practices and for communicating
and coordinating across organizational boundaries. The
fifth question, ‘What are the effects of the new incentive
system (co-financing and payment regulation) for your
work practices and for coordination between primary
and secondary care?’ was left for the ending because it
was supposed to be the most sensitive due to the associ-
ation between quality of care and economic issues. All
the interviews lasted from 45 to 60 min. We have
recorded and transcribed 21 of them. For the other six
(when respondents declared not feeling comfortable with
speaking in front of a recorder or when, for technical
reasons, we have not been able to record the interview),
we took detailed notes during the interviews, including
quotes from the speech, and we merged notes just after
the interview to build an accurate and detailed report.
This should have partially mitigated the lack of direct
recording.
Data analysis
Interview transcripts and detailed notes were manually
coded following a grounded theory approach to extract
themes from the interviews [50]. The two authors read
each transcript and notes and listed significant statements.
Next, the authors reviewed the transcripts and notes for
meaning and labeled the participants’ statements [51]. The
authors then decided jointly what they regarded as a
significant statement. The joint decision was made to
achieve consensus about the manner in which to organize
the statements into distinct themes [52]. This allowed us
to enrich our analysis with multiple interpretations and to
achieve subjective understanding across coders [53, 54].
This method generated varied themes and sub-thematic
areas that captured the essence of the debate. Inspired by
the logic of second-order analysis [55], we have tried to
offer (in the discussion section) an “interpretation of what
transpired that goes beyond that offered by the infor-
mants” [56]. This approach is in line with ‘systematic
Table 1 List of Respondents
Respondent Organization Department/Ward
R1 Hospital Department A
R2 Hospital Department A
R3 Hospital Ward B
R4 Hospital Ward C
R5 Hospital Ward C
R6 Hospital Ward D
R7 Hospital Department B
R8 Hospital Department A
R9 Hospital Ward E
R10 Mal Municipality IT-service unit
R11 Mal Municipality IT- service unit
R12 Mal Municipality IT- service unit
R13 Mal Municipality Home care unit
R14 Mal Municipality Home care unit
R15 Mal Municipality Ordering Office
R16 Mal Municipality Ordering Office
R17 Mel Municipality Health and Care Services
R18 Mel Municipality Health and Care Services
R19 Mil Municipality IT-service unit
R20 Mil Municipality Ordering Office
R21 Mil Municipality Health and Care Services
R22 Mol Municipality Health and Care Services
R23 Mol Municipality Health and Care Services
R24 Mul Municipality Service Management Unit
R25 Myl Municipality Ordering Office
R26 Mes Municipality Home care unit
R27 Regional Health Authority Representative
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combining’ – an ‘abductive approach’ to research, which
has been described as a nonlinear, path-dependent process
of combining efforts to match theory and reality [57].
Trustworthiness of data was thus enhanced through
searching for alternative explanations and linking the
findings and conclusions to data and evidence from the
literature [48].
Results
The uses of the new ICT solution
The previous communication solution – using a fax for
messaging between hospitals and municipalities, was
based on two main messages sent by the hospital. The
first message informed the municipality about the
patient’s admission to the hospital/ward and provided in-
formation about the patient’s illness and expected date
of discharge. The second message was sent by the hos-
pital to the municipality when the patient was ready to
be discharged. Care personnel in each ward were re-
quired to enter these “schemas” on their computer, print
them out, and send them anonymously via fax to the
relevant municipality. A follow-up phone call was always
required to verify that the fax had reached the recipient
and to reveal the patient’s identity. In the new solution,
which is part of the electronic patient journal, the mes-
sages developed are correlated by name, structure, and
function that reflect the specific patient case they are
meant to support and result in a set of eight different
(PLO) messages (Fig. 1).
Figure 1 depicts the designed flow of communication be-
tween a hospital and municipalities. This is an interesting
document because it shows that, despite the PLO system
being introduced to improve communication between hos-
pitals and municipalities, the flow of communication was
predominantly designed in a logic ‘from hospital to munici-
palities’ according to the direction of the arrows.
When asked how the system works in practice, respond-
ent R5 in Ward C at the Hospital described the communi-
cation flow between the Hospital and the municipalities as
based on the following main messages/steps:
1. A hospital nurse sends message 1, the notice of the
admitted patient, to the ordering office
(Bestillerkontoret) at the relevant municipality
responsible for deciding the type and level of care
the patient will need after hospitalization.
2. A nurse sends message 2 to the ordering office. This
message contains health information about the
patient plus expected discharge date. The tentative
discharge date is decided after consultations among
and between the nurses and doctor in charge of that
patient and is usually communicated within 30 min
after the decision has been taken.
3. The nurse sends message 3 to the ordering office
when the patient is ready for discharge. This
message normally describes the illness, treatment,
and conditions (physical and mental) but also tends
to suggest follow-up care for patients.
4. Through the ‘dialogue’ type of message, the ordering
office usually communicates to the hospital the
decision on care the patient will receive after
hospitalization, and the hospital can comment/
disagree with the decision and start sending
messages back and forth, but it is the ordering office
that has the last word.
5. Message 4 is the discharge protocol, which is a
report to the municipality’s nurses and doctors who
will be involved in the patient’s care after discharge.
Fig. 1 Blueprint of the PLO communication system [78]
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Such description raises two key issues. First, we note
that the Hospital ‘suggests’ to municipalities the follow-
up care the patient should receive after discharge,
although the ordering office has the formal authority to
decide the type and level of care the patient needs.
Second, we note that this ‘suggestion’ is more like a
‘strong recommendation’ when the ‘dialogue’ function
has to be used to debate the issue.
In general, users of the new solutions have responded
in a positive way to the new system. PLO has been re-
vealed to be effective in overcoming the shortcomings of
the previous solution. Although, according to a respond-
ent in the Hospital, the use of free text space is a barrier
to its full exploitation (R3), the new system makes the
communication process smoother and more efficient
(R18). The new solution enables health care workers to
avoid the frustration of repeated calling when they get
no answers (R19, R24) and affords them the possibility
of answering in a calm moment without the interruption
of other working activities (R24). Electronic messages
did not completely substitute phone calls and are used
in a flexible way. When information to be exchanged is
‘delicate and has nothing to do with the patient journal,’
then a phone call is the privileged means, and the con-
tent of the call would not be recorded in the system
(R15). But, if there is something in oral communication
that needs to be recorded, then users write a wrap-up
message just after the dialogue to be documented in the
electronic patient journal (R24). Written messages are
also perceived as important in relation to eventual dis-
putes concerning the payment regulation:
‘If a “notice of discharged patient” comes to us
[ordering office] after 2.30 in the afternoon we do not
have to pay anything… but they [the Hospital] can tell
us later that they sent this message… and we can say
“where is it?” We can show them there is no message
about this patient going home and we avoid incurring
a fine’ (R26).
Interestingly, our respondents stress what they per-
ceive as misuse of the new system by their counterpart.
From one side, hospital practitioners find that munici-
palities may be messaging too frequently. According to
the respondents in the Wards B and C, hospital nurses
have limited time available to handle PLO, compared
with personnel at the municipal ordering office, who
spend most of their time on the computer doing admin-
istrative work (R5). On the other side, municipalities also
lament malpractices by the Hospital in using the messa-
ging system. In particular, they reproach to the Hospital
for not respecting the timing prescribed for sending a
notice of discharge to the ordering office. It happens that
the Hospital sends a message about a care service
cancellation too late for the ordering office to re-route it
to the home care unit (R13). Hospital sometimes forget
to send the message of an admitted patient, and so they
then send both messages – of a patient’s admission and
discharge – at the same time (R15). This causes planning
troubles for the municipality, which then has to arrange
the care service in a constrained timeframe possibly
leading to patients lying in hospital for longer than the
hospital had planned (R24).
Decision’s ownership
A key issue that emerged during our interviews concerns
the hospital interference in the ordering office’s deci-
sions. In the Norwegian health care system, the munici-
pality, usually represented by a care professional sitting
at the ordering office, is responsible for making decisions
about the care service a patient receives after
hospitalization. The ordering office is a unit that was in-
troduced around 2000, following the new public man-
agement turn (R21) and the introduction of the
purchaser-provider model, according to which there
should be a separation between who approves a contract
for care and who provides that service [58].
There are clear rules regulating this decision-making
process: the hospital is responsible for describing pa-
tients’ conditions, including their functionalities, and,
based on this information, ordering offices do their as-
sessment and decide on the service to be provided.
Despite the rules, this practice often generates contro-
versies that unexpectedly are voiced in the ‘dialogue
function’ included in the new communication system.
According to our respondent in the Department A at
the Hospital:
‘hospital practitioners sometimes pretend to know
about the care services patients need after discharge
and make explicit suggestions about them, although
this is not their responsibility’ (R2).
A respondent at Mal Municipality explained this mat-
ter in terms of power dynamics:
‘We feel the balance is a little uneven…the hospital
feels it has more power. The reform has given the
municipality more power, but they don’t see it as
such…they feel much more work pressure – not
power … and when the hospital asks or tells what
service the patient should have, the municipality feels
it is being pushed and told what to do, without an
opportunity to choose…’ (R12).
It is not rare that in difficult cases – when care personnel
at the hospital and those at the municipality disagree about
a decision to be taken – someone from the municipality
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personally visits the patient (R11) because sometimes ‘what
the municipality observe and what the hospital observes is
different’ (R26). Very often, the disagreement is around the
kind of care, because, as one of our respondent explained,
the hospital tends to suggest a more intensive level of care
than the municipality (R16). Decisions become even more
complicated to make when hospital practitioners ‘promise’
(R20) a certain care service to the patient or his/her
relatives:
‘If the doctors or nurses at the hospital have said that
the right level of care is an institution [nursing home
or similar], then it becomes really difficult for us to
argue for something different… so, sometimes we
have to take them to an institution [nursing home or
similar] maybe for some days/a week and then home
… we have to find a compromise’ (R22)
Although the ordering office has the formal authority
to decide about the care of the patient, it is dependent
on the hospital’s decisions, first regarding the expected
date of discharge and, second, at the moment of actual
discharge. It is worth noting there have been very few
cases in which respondents have emphasized the need to
cooperate – interact more intensively between munici-
palities and hospitals. Respondent R6 in the Ward D is
among the few recognizing the importance of collabor-
ation between the hospital and municipality for the
discharge to be successful. R6 describes this hospital–
municipality interdependence as follows:
‘…the problem is that for many patients we have a
training responsibility [e.g., for home care nurses], and
although we could do the training, there is no one to
train. The question is then: should we start
communicating discharge before training anyone? We
cannot discharge a patient until the personnel are trained.’
What makes the discharge process challenging is also
the fact that, at the hospital, the decision to discharge is
taken and then changed several times, thus making it
sometimes difficult for the municipality in planning for
the solutions (R18, R24). Still, a respondent in the home
care unit (R14) at Mal Municipality said the new com-
munication system helps in monitoring the situation; the
coordinators are used to reading the exchange of mes-
sages between the ordering office and the Hospital. A
coordinator explained that it is also a matter of how ser-
ious the patient’s conditions are:
‘If I see that “difficult” patients are being admitted to
hospital, I pay attention to the messages. But, if I see
“easy” patients, I do not really pay attention to what is
happening’ (R14).
Our interviews further revealed that the doctor–nurse
relationship at the hospital plays a major role in the
stability/instability of the decisions regarding discharge.
Even though the doctor has the formal responsibility for
that decision, the discharge decisions often tend to be
nurse-driven, and nurses are trying to keep doctors aware
of the need to respect fixed dates for discharge. The
following quote is an example of the dynamics related
to discharge decisions in one of the Hospital wards:
‘…when there are a lot of decisions and re-decisions, a
lot of messages back and forth is irritating…[for the
ordering office]. This often happens when nurses and
doctors do not speak to each other earlier [during pa-
tients’ hospitalization]. When the team is working
well, we [hospital staff] are much more precise in our
information, in our suggestion about expected date of
discharge. [A good team] is when nurses and doctors
find it important to have a plan and remember to take
decisions…sometimes the nurse is too quick to give
information about discharge [to the municipalities],
while the doctor needs more time to evaluate and
treat the patient…sometimes there is a difference [of
opinion] between nurses and doctors about what is
realistic [in terms of expected date of discharge] … we
[nurses] observe the patient from the time he comes
to hospital to when he leaves … we see more or less
everything that needs to be done … doctors are more
focused on the specific illness…’ (R5).
Different ‘languages’
According to one of the respondents of the Department
A at Hospital, the challenges during the discharge
process revolve partly around the differences in assessing
patients’ need:
‘municipal health care providers and the Hospital do
not speak the same language…The hospital focuses on
medicine; the municipalities focus on function and
rehabilitation…that is whether the patients can live
alone, get dressed, use stairs etc.… This has always
been a problem, but the implementation of PLO
messages has shed light on this’ (R1).
It was somehow unexpected to discover that the
design of the new ICT system does not incorporate a
specific function for exchanging information about the
patients’ activities of daily living (ADL). As a conse-
quence, professionals currently tend to use the ‘dialogue
function’ (and eventually phone calls) to exchange this
type of information (R26).
Respondents on the municipalities’ side point out that
there is a great variation in the quality of information
transmitted by the Hospital on ADL (R19) but confirm
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that when the Hospital is asked about further informa-
tion, it generally replies with satisfactory information
(R26, R23). To overcome the problem of lack of infor-
mation lamented by municipalities, a creative solution
was developed by a nurse of Ward C in collaboration
with some municipality colleagues (R4). This consists of
a laminated pocket card to be used as a guideline in the
department. When sending an electronic message to the
municipality, the nurses would easily extract the card
from their pocket and check whether they have filled the
message form with the needed information. In this way,
less dialogue messages would be sent back and forth on
lacking information (R24, R4).
With the introduction of the new incentive scheme,
decisions made on discharge are not only a question of
principle but also have tangible economic consequences.
Indeed, a reason why the hospital often negotiates with
the ordering office about decisions is related to the pay-
ment regulation reform (Betalingsforskrift).
Change in economic incentives
The payment regulation reform established that munici-
palities must pay a fee to the hospital for every 24-h
delay in receiving a patient when he/she is ready to leave
the hospital. Prior to the coordination reform, the muni-
cipality had 10 days to decide and plan the appropriate
care service before incurring a fee. The hospitals, how-
ever, were not obliged to issue a bill for the fee.
Currently, the rule has changed, and the payment regu-
lation reform makes the fee mandatory. However, due to
the poor data input and the outcomes of some legal dis-
putes, we found that the Hospital actually issues bills for
60% of the extra days of recovery (R7). Regarding this
loss, the representative of the Regional Health Authority
explains:
‘the Hospital has really bad documentation on when
the patient is reported “ready to be discharged” and if
the patient is not reported to be ready for discharge
when he/she is actually is, then the Hospital loses
these days [meaning losing bills related to these
days]…They [at the hospital] do not know exactly
how they shall report this: instead of adding [in the
accounting system] the extra days after discharge,
they often delete the whole thing and start a new
discharge period…this is something that is not going
exactly as planned’ (R27).
The municipality, which does not want to incur a pen-
alty, is forced to plan in advance. The experience and
opinions of our interviewees vary substantially on
whether the payment regulation has achieved the
intended results. First, from the Hospital’s point of view,
the new incentive system does not change the budgeting
and income structure, as the income imputable to the
new payment regulation and to the co-financing on hos-
pital admissions on selected somatic health services rep-
resent a minor part of their income. It seems the
Hospital issues the bills because it is ‘obliged’ to do so
and may not find the benefits of the additional adminis-
trative duties and costs. The idea with this billing prac-
tice was that municipalities would have been encouraged
to receive patients who need municipal services as fast
as possible. The co-financing instrument to reduce the
number of admissions to the hospital did not produce
the anticipated effects because, as two of our respon-
dents evidenced, municipalities have no responsibility in
relation to sending patients to hospital (R22, R23). This
co-financing instrument was, in fact, removed in 2015.
The question remains open concerning the fee fixed to
4,500 Nok per day: Has it really been set in a way that
constitutes an incentive for municipalities? If one should
judge based on the indicative costs of services provided
at the municipality – around 8,000-9,000 Nok per day
for “regular” care services and up to 50,000 Nok for the
most advanced treatment (R27) – the answer would
probably be negative. According to the respondent of
the Regional Health Authorities (R27) in Norway from
2012 to 2014, the total number of bed days in hospitals
decreased (−1.8%) in the region of competence, but the
number of days in the Hospital after discharge increased
(+3,000 patient days for the Hospital and + 20,000
patient days for the entire region). When asked about
possible reasons for this increase, our respondent won-
dered whether ‘it is due to increasing readmissions, and
then one can ask if it is the competences out in the field
[primary care] that are poor or if it is the hospital that
sends patients home too early’ (R27).
Adapting to the new incentive scheme
Returning to the effects of the penalties, we collected diver-
gent, sometimes contradictory views. One of the respon-
dents (from ordering office) was determined to declare that
he/she did not care about the payment issue when he/she
made decisions, as he/she would consider only what was
best for the patient (R23). One respondent (at Ward C)
suggested that, when there is no free capacity, the ordering
office, unable to offer nursing home care to a patient ready
to leave the Hospital , can decide to redirect the patient to
another service unit, such as the home care unit, in order
to avoid incurring payment of a fee. When the Hospital
suspects this is the case, it can raise the issue with the or-
dering office. In a different ward (Ward E), Respondent R9
has a different perception of this issue. R9 explained that
municipalities tend to leave the patient at the Hospital lon-
ger than necessary because when care services at munici-
palities are fully booked, it costs less to pay the fee to the
Hospital than to pay for services provided by other
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institutions. The respondent also explained that this prac-
tice is risky:
‘patients who do not need treatment in hospital
should leave as soon as possible to avoid the risk of
incurring unexpected infections’ (R9).
On the municipality side, we have collected different
reactions regarding the payment issue. Respondents have
stressed the importance of not incurring delays in taking
care of patients after discharge and, thus, to pay the pen-
alties. Other respondents have explained to us that
patients may have to stay in the Hospital after discharge
because they are assessed to be ready to be discharged
too early (and much earlier than in the past). As a result,
municipalities ‘are receiving patients who are sicker and
sicker’ to the extent that sometimes the municipalities
do not have ‘the competences to treat the patient in
such condition at all’ (R17). Some of the interviewees
have even suggested readmissions should be checked
because they believe that with the coordination reform –
and the focus on efficiency – length of stay in hospital
before discharge is decreasing but against an increase in
readmissions (R15, R26).
A solution some municipalities adopt to address the
problem of receiving sicker patients than in the past is
allocating some ‘observation-beds’ for patients who have
been discharged but the ordering office is unsure (or not
ready) about the service to be offered (R24). Such ‘obser-
vation beds’ have not been implemented in all munici-
palities. Mil and Mol Municipality adopted a different
practice to address the unexpected discharge of patients
requiring complex treatment:
‘we rather prefer to pay for extra days at the hospital
instead of being unsure of whether we can take care
of the patient or not’ (R21).
‘we have discussed the possibility of having these
“three-day observation beds” but concluded that we
do not need them; we would rather give the patients a
short-term place in a nursing home for a week and
then we see…’ (R23).
In relation to the use of observation beds one of the re-
spondent told us that a similar solution was experimented
in 2009 (and closed down in 2013), in which an ‘intermedi-
ate unit’ was developed at the Hospital, in collaboration
with four related municipalities, to manage the transition of
patients from hospital to municipal care (R8).
Besides introduction of ‘observation beds,’ municipal-
ities, to cope with undergoing changes, had to upgrade
the competences of their personnel (R25) by receiving
training from the Hospital but also hiring more special-
ized staff, as exemplified in the following quotes:
‘there is a team of three nurses at hospital who go out
and train our [municipalities] nurses on special
procedures we did not do before…at the nursing home
they have hired new personnel so there are more nurses
during the same shift to deal with the new procedures
and the complexity of the patients’ (R23).
‘before, we had various supervisory doctors who had
part-time positions; now, we have a supervisory
doctor in a permanent position, and doctors visit
patients at short-term three days per week, while
before, they did visits one day per week’ (R24).
In some cases, the need for special procedures has also
led municipalities to rely on private health care
institutions:
‘we struggle a lot to have competent people for very
special cases, so I think we are getting a new market
here for private companies for very difficult cases
coming to nursing homes and to help institutions,
and I do not think this was the intent of the
coordination reform’ (R21).
The fact that the economic considerations (the penalty
in particular) might interfere with decisions on care ser-
vices to be offered has been raised as a problematic con-
sequence of the reform; the feeling is that it may be
money that prevails, not the patient (R2).
Discussion
The effects of the coordination reform and the two top-
down instruments the Norwegian health authority pro-
motes – ICT-based communication and economic
incentives – have clearly transcended the aims ascribed
to these. The two instruments interact with each other
and with the broader context of arrangements and regu-
lations in which they have been ‘implemented.’ A con-
sistent overall picture of the effects of the two measures
is difficult to draw because of the ‘in becoming’ nature
of the processes explored and the variety of organiza-
tions and individuals involved. There are at least three
issues that are worth discussing, as they might guide
future policies directed to improve care coordination.
Information needs and communication
Similar to studies on the use of electronic communication
between nurses in home care and general practitioners
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[59, 60], we found that the users of the new PLO messages
recognized the benefits of the new ICT system for exchan-
ging information and communicating. In particular, the
new system seems to fit well with the nature of work in
both settings. Users at the Hospital perceive as one of the
major benefits the possibility of sending and collecting ne-
cessary information without the pressure of being reached
‘on’ the phone. Users at municipalities feel more secure in
having a written track of all the communication back and
forth from the Hospital on which they can also rely in case
of disputes. This points to the accountability role of the
new technology [27].
However, if we flip the coin, both benefits reflect some
reciprocal dissatisfaction. Professionals at the Hospital
seem to be relieved by the decreasing need of synchronous
dialogues with their colleagues at Municipalities. They re-
veal a general tendency of considering communication
one way, where the hospital is the sender and the munici-
pality the receiver. On the other side, municipality care
personnel signal a certain mistrust on the Hospital’s abil-
ity/willingness to provide them with appropriate and
timely information and see the new system as a tool for
documenting shortcomings in the Hospital’s communica-
tion to municipalities. Documentation of the dialogue in
the electronic patient journal also means a more formal
dialogue, with the clear benefit of more extensive and eas-
ier exchange of information, while possibly reducing valu-
able informal conversational evaluations. It is evident
from our study that the system’s blueprint which articu-
lates the steps and timing of communication between the
two actors does not automatically translate into a
smoother and more timely flow of information exchange.
When asked about how the collaboration with the
counterpart works, our respondents focused on the dis-
charge process. In the new ICT system, there is no
standard for the exchange of information on patients’
ADL that is fundamental to the ordering office at the
municipality for its main task to assess patient’s condi-
tions and decide after-hospitalization services. There are
several reasons for the absence of a space to accommo-
date this information in the current system. First, as for
all new ICT technologies, PLO was introduced while up-
grades of the system were in progress. This means that
this function might be included in the future. Second,
translating ADL information in a standard format, likely
based on a numerical scale, poses several challenges, not
the least in terms of finding a common understanding of
ADL and of the risks associated with a non-continuous
(or erroneous) update of this critical information. Fur-
thermore, our study has identified a further challenge.
Similar to a previous study illustrating the cultural diver-
sity between hospital and community nurses [40], we
found that community professionals are often not satis-
fied with assessments provided by the Hospital because
their expertise in assessing patients’ conditions is differ-
ent from that of the Hospital. As a consequence, the
assessment of a patient’s condition can follow different
paths. Typical is a scaling up from the use of the ‘dia-
logue function’ to ask additional information when the
hospital is lacking in the information provided to muni-
cipalities, to phone calls when disagreements among the
parties do not allow managing the conversation by mes-
saging, to direct visits to patients, usually when a reso-
lution to the tension has not been found. This pattern is
in line with what has been highlighted in a previous
study that ‘IT can support the transfer of data in the post
discharge period but coordinated decision making
requires dialogue and agreement among different pro-
viders and between providers and patients’ [2].
Although tensions between the two health care actors
during the discharge process are not an exception, cases
where the collaboration runs smoothly are common.
Collaboration appears to run smoothly when professionals
at the Hospital take seriously the information needs of
their colleagues at the primary care level. The pocket card
created by a hospital nurse to be used as a reminder on
which information (on ADL) to send to municipalities is
an episode that shows a certain sensibility and respect for
the work of colleagues on the other side [61]. Electronic
messages between hospital and municipalities made the
Hospital more aware of its duties during the discharge
planning process as was expected to happen before the
introduction of electronic patient journal in hospitals [62].
Polarizing economic incentives
The punishing incentive scheme introduced by the coord-
ination reform appears to collide with other policies which
push hospitals to increase productivity and slow spending
growth [63]. Our case clearly shows that, while the Hospital
has adapted to the demands for efficiency by shortening the
length of stay at the Hospital, municipalities seem to adapt
more gradually (slowly) to earlier discharge. The scenario
that an earlier discharge process opened up at primary level
of care is varied (possibly confusing), depending on how
the sanctioning incentive has been perceived by each muni-
cipality and on the capacity of municipalities to upgrade
the existing competences and services. Essentially, patients
in need of after-hospitalization care who cannot be received
at municipality have to remain at the Hospital longer than
necessary or can be transferred into ‘observation beds,’
which entails adding a further step in the patient pathway.
A punishing incentive scheme, such as a penalty for delays
in receiving patients ready for discharge, without a system-
atic strategy for developing the right arrangements to ac-
commodate their needs, can put patients’ safety at risk and
is in contrast with the ambition of advancing care coordin-
ation. The reform has generated a series of chain effects
that have ‘forced’ local authorities to organize, more or less
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temporarily, new care services such as observation beds or
cooperation with private actors for service provision [64].
We found that most animated conversations between
hospitals and primary care are triggered by disagreements
about the moment of discharge and the underlying eco-
nomic incentives. This creates a somewhat paradoxical situ-
ation. On the one hand, the coordination reform aims at
improving coordination between primary and secondary
care, and the PLO communication system is a platform for
interaction intended to improve communication and, thus,
facilitate collaboration. At the same time, the payment regu-
lation introduced by the coordination reform brings about a
‘win–lose’ logic that, rather than connecting and integrating
the two organizations, pegs these against each other. Fol-
lowing the economic incentives, the organizations involved
tend to prioritize their own, rather than the joint interests.
This ‘win–lose’ logic clearly nourishes the asymmetric
pattern of collaboration between hospital and municipality
[19]. The fact that a punishing incentive has been
addressed to the municipalities, but not to the Hospital –
for instance, when they delay in sending the notice of dis-
charge – strengthens once more the privileged position of
hospitals. Our study confirms that there are “no equal
voices of participants” [47] and that the large hospitals
sometimes impose “a ‘hospital-centred’ view of healthcare
– particularly with regard to providers who care for pa-
tients post-discharge” [9]. A clear example is when the
Hospital ‘strongly recommends’ to municipalities which
care service the patients should receive after discharge, or
when the Hospital communicates to the patient and/or
family members which after-hospitalization service he/she
will receive. Doing so, the Hospital attempts to expand
their jurisdiction over municipalities’ tasks [5]. Sharpening
the distinctions between the parties’ roles appears to lead
to tougher negotiations and stronger efforts to maintain
individual privileges and responsibilities, rather than to
engage in open dialogue about patients. In particular,
municipalities perceive the workload of changes in place
mostly on their charge and do not see this to be counter-
balanced by any empowerment implied by the reform.
This raises the question whether those to whom power
was devolved were equipped or minded enough to engin-
eer the shifts [43]. However, to avoid further polarization
of interests and contrasting logics, a shift is needed toward
financial incentives more “consistent with an integrated
health care system” [65].
The need for shared vision and acting jointly
We found that legal or regulatory requirements play an
important role in relationships between hospital and
municipalities [66]. The reform has reaffirmed the dis-
tinction of roles and responsibility between the two
levels of care, thus reinforcing their distinct jurisdic-
tional domains [67]. The challenge is to find a way to
shift from collaboration based on local economic incen-
tives to collaboration based on the idea of joint responsi-
bility. Such a shift is likely to involve creating shared
incentives [68] and shared performance measures [69]
so that both hospitals and primary care physicians have
incentives to offer post-discharge care needed for a
smooth transition between a hospital and home. In a
context such as the one this paper examines, health pol-
icymakers need to address a fundamental question:
Should decisions about health care services after dis-
charge continue to be an exclusive matter of the care
professional at the municipality level or should a joint
decision-making across health institutions be favored to
improve the coordination process and its efficacy also in
terms of patient care? Furthermore, if the intention is to
shift toward a more patient-centred approach [70], deci-
sions regarding after-hospitalization services should
include the voice of patients more systematically.
Effective coordination between primary and hospital care
depends on the quality of relationships among different
professionals [62]. Therefore, improving coordination
requires the development of cooperative voluntary inter-
organizational relationships. Complex and tacit knowledge,
as the one needed in health care settings, is more readily
connected and accessed through strong relationships [9].
Accordingly, more attention has to be devoted to the design
of mechanisms to manage inter-organizational relation-
ships. In a context where ‘centrally orchestrated coordin-
ation’ [71] is ruled out, developing a tightly coupled health
care system has to follow other paths. These are likely to
involve making the project a joint endeavor [72], emphasiz-
ing common understanding instead of accountability, and
transforming outsiders into insiders by engaging in conver-
sation about operational aspects or even by designing
‘boundary-crossing roles’ [73]. To overcome the hurdle of
the preconceptions of other health care providers, recogniz-
ing and understanding each other’s work practices, or ‘in-
terconnected practices’ [74], is crucial. This requires better
mutual understanding and necessitates a social perspective-
taking aptitude as “the ability to understand how a situation
appears to another person…to put oneself in the place of
others and recognize that other individuals may have points
of view different from one’s own” [75]. Superior perspective
taking has been linked to positive outcomes that include
more effective cooperation [75], better communication
[76], and the resolution of conflicts [77], all of which appear
crucial in care provision managed and practiced as joint
collective responsibility and are conditions for the entire
health care network to co-develop.
Our study confirms that enhancing care coordination
is a “multifaceted phenomenon and more complicated
than health policy suggests” [11]. Improving coordin-
ation in complex settings, such as the health care sys-
tem, requires complex instruments that need to be
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monitored for the effects they produce independently of
the aim declared and ascribed to them [44].
Despite the potential contribution of the current study,
there are some limitations worth noting. First, the use of
a convenience sample of a care professional derived
from a limited number of divisions at the Hospital, as
well as a subset of the 21 municipalities in the catch-
ment area of the Hospital, limit the generalizability of
the findings. Future research may use a more diverse
sample by obtaining data from a larger number of pro-
fessionals at the Hospital as well as at municipality level.
Conclusion
This study has examined the effects of two government
measures intended to improve coordination among health-
care organizations. The study sheds light on the controver-
sial nature of top-down instruments, especially when these
imply spanning across professions and organizational
boundaries. The challenge in coordinating primary and sec-
ondary care evidenced in this study is to find a way to shift
from collaboration based on local economic incentives to
collaboration based on the idea of joint responsibility and
voluntary cooperative relationships which requires ‘com-
mon and joint’ incentive schemes. Our study adds to previ-
ous studies on care coordination by directing attention to
the need to harmonize and integrate policies and under-
lying incentive schemes across organizations within the
health care system. We believe that this exploratory study
offers some guidance to policy makers especially when
evaluating incentive schemes, and it informs health profes-
sionals at primary and secondary care level on the recipro-
cal communicative shortcomings that affect coordination
across organizations. We also hope our study can spur
health service researchers to further develop our under-
standing of the mechanisms through which coordination
between primary and secondary care can be achieved.
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